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The Rhetoric of the Rearguard?
Sincerity in Innovative American
Poetics
Nicholas Manning
1 In the context of twentieth-century American verse, poetic sincerity has undergone a
problematic literary historical  evolution.  Since at  least  the mid-nineteenth century,
proponents of sincerity as an aesthetic and ethical criterion often eschewed values of
polysemy and ambiguity in favour of semantic and subjective transparency. Advocates
of these prior models frequently sought to use poetic language in order to attain more
stable  points  of  anchorage—whether  in  the  self  or  the  world—beyond  the  moving
morass of  poetic  signs,  with their  ever expanding semiosis.  In doing so,  such post-
Romantic conceptions often paradoxically sought to transcend, or even abolish,  the
agonistic tensions of poetic language itself. 
2 Poetic sincerity can never be understood, however, as that which provides an escape
from language; depending on a readerly act of deliberate credulity, its potential value
may  only  be  glimpsed  if  we  accept  that  sincerity  is  necessarily  a  construction  of
language, as imbricated in the problems of self and sense as any other verbal artifice. In
my study Rhétorique de la sincérité (2013), I argue that poetic sincerity functions much
like  a  rhetorical  figure,  in  that  it  never ceases  to  illuminate  the  complex  web  of
enunciative, axiological and identarian issues at stake in modern poetic praxis. For this
reason, I abstain from proposing a reductive definition of the likes that Lionel Trilling
and Henri Peyre provided in the mid-twentieth century, respectively “a congruence
between  avowal  and  actual  feeling,”  (Trilling,  2)  and  the  demand  that  a  writer
“conform  his  life  to  his  ideas”  (Peyre,  237).  Such  adequational  models  focus  the
question of sincerity on a mythical, and in the end futile, quest for congruence—in the
case of Trilling, between avowal and actual feeling; in the case of Peyre, between life
and ideas. We can never determine if such congruence has been attained for the reason
that  the  two  terms  of  this  agreement  remain  impossible  to  define,  much  less
theoretically equate.  What,  after all,  is  “actual feeling”? How is actual feeling to be
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distinguished from a supposedly artificial affect when all poetic emotion is necessarily,
in part, a construction of an ethos, and thus an artificial product of a self-reflexive
interrogation? What, moreover, is it  to “conform one’s life to one’s ideas”? What is
“life”? Which “ideas”? Not to mention how such a congruence may manifest itself in the
formal confines of a poetic. 
3 Rather than restricting the criterion to a set definition, I thus propose expanding, or
rather exploding poetic sincerity’s hermeneutic limits so that it  concerns—as is  the
case for many modern poets—not only expression but also perception; not only affect
and emotionality but also conception and intellection; not only the affirmation of a
unified or authentic self but also the dramatisation of diverse lyrical identities which
often  enter  into  dialogue  or  conflict.  Rather  than  applying  a  generalised,  a  priori
definition  of  sincerity  to  specific  poetics,  we  may  rather  approach  the  question
inversely—that is,  by observing that each poetic forges its  own rhetorical  modes of
negotiating  the  question  of  sincere  discourse.  This  approach  does  not  lead  to  an
absolute heterogeneity or relativism, wherein such is the multiplicity of the pluralised
sincerities  on  offer,  the  theorisation  of  the  criterion  becomes  unfeasible.  It  rather
recognises that no vision of poetic sincerity may be abstracted from the semiotic and
profoundly social context within which it actively takes on poetic form.
4 The notion of sincerity, associated at the dawn of American poetic modernism with
primarily  innovative  or  avant-garde  poetries,  has  steadily  metamorphosed—or  for
some critics, metastasised—into  an expressivist,  ideational,  supposedly  conservative
poetic value.1 From a notion used by Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot in their attacks against
Romantic expressivity and ideational excess, it became a notion primarily associated
with  the  affirmation  of  a  unified  self,  and  the  expressive  adequation  of  this  self’s
language with its inner world. In the space of a mere half-century, poetic sincerity thus
transformed from a fundamental tenet of radical modernism into an incarnation of
lyrical, confessional orthodoxy. 
5 For the Black Mountain and Objectivist poets of the 1960s, and most notably for Louis
Zukofsky, sincerity was far from an expressivist criterion. For such innovative post-war
movements  it  was  on  the  contrary  a  profoundly  phenomenological  notion,  less
concerned with expressive paradigms of “true speech” or with subjective quests for the
inner coherency of the self than with the poem as a perceptive encounter with the
world. If this is indeed the case, why did the Zukofskian model of a perceptive sincerity
have  so  few  subsequent  advocates,  while  other  aspects  of  Zukofsky’s  poetics  were
readily adopted and integrated into innovative movements such as the New American
Poetry or language-centred writing? Why does the term “sincerity” conspicuously fade
from view in the theoretical and critical texts of innovative poetic traditions from the
1970s  on?  And lastly,  why  have  the  occasional  efforts  to  reintegrate  sincerity  into
avant-garde poetic traditions—such as the problematic New Sincerity of the 1990s—met
with limited success?
6 I do not hope to provide definitive answers here to these complex questions. I intend
instead  to  help  explain  this  curious  literary-historical  evolution  by  tracing  a  more
appropriate  historiography  of  a  poetic  principle  which  cannot,  in  the  end,  be
inherently  associated  with  either  so-called  avant-garde  or  arrière-garde  praxes.  In
many ways, this disconnect between innovative poetics and the criterion of sincerity
may be traced back to the fundamentally wrongheaded association between sincerity
and expression. This problematic heritage, reinforced by the theoretical formulations
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of such post-war critics as Lionel Trilling and Henri Peyre, effectively frustrated the
recuperation of sincerity by innovative traditions. Such recuperation seems possible
today not through the creation of new forms of “sincere” expression, but rather by
distancing sincerity from the very notion of expressivity itself.
 
Sincerity as Romantic or Anti-Romantic Criterion? 
7 In  order  to  understand  this  shift,  we  must  first  try  to  grasp  the  unusual
historiographical functioning of poetic sincerity more generally.  Crucially, sincerity,
even moreso than other criteria, is a weapon used by opposing antagonists throughout
literary history to defend startlingly divergent visions of literary texts. Nowhere is this
fact more evident than in the opposing historical visions espoused by the two major
monographs on literary sincerity of the mid-twentieth century, namely Sincerity and
Authenticity by Lionel Trilling, and Literature and Sincerity by Henri Peyre. 
8 For Lionel Trilling, the literary historical moment when sincerity was the most valued
and  prized  corresponds  to  the  florescence  of  European  Romanticism.  Romanticism
represents, for Trilling, the high point of an aesthetic theory emphasising a coherent
and  reflexive  ethos,  which  demands  a  new  expressive  congruence  between  poetic
speech and personal  identity.  Sincerity is  thus conceived as a profoundly Romantic
principle. Concerning this era, however which Trilling sees as the veritable apotheosis
of  literary  sincerity,  Peyre  observes:  “a  score  of  critics  and  social  interpreters  or
reformers of literature poured insult on the Romantics [...] because they had lied to
themselves or failed to see soberly and lucidly into themselves” (239). Peyre goes on to
claim that “the age of sincerity” (137), which he defines as an upheaval in all the arts
between  1908  and  1913,  was  precisely  a  reaction  against  the  perceived  falsity  and
emotional  copia of  Romantic  art.  He affirms that  “for  the  first  time,  a  literary  and
artistic revolution was not heralded by the battle cry of ‘Nature and Truth,’ but rather
by  the  determination  to  be  more  sincere.”  Peyre  thus  sees  sincerity  as  “an
antiromantic reaction  [...]  directed  against  what  had  often  been  sham  in  romantic
emotions and the excessive or garish expression with which those emotions had been
coloured”  (239).  For  Trilling,  in  contrast,—and  in  accordance  with  a  vision  of
Romanticism which we know well from literary encyclopedias—sincerity weakens with
the Modernist questioning of the self as a stable source of subjective value: 
The  [modern]  devaluation  of  sincerity  is  bound  up  in  an  essential  although
paradoxical way with the mystique of the classic literature of our century, some of
whose masters took the position that, in relation to their work and their audience,
they were not persons or selves, they were artists, by which they meant they were
exactly not, in the phrase with which Wordsworth began his definition of the poet,
men speaking to men. (10)
9 This vision of Romanticism, and concomitantly of Romantic sincerity, deployed by both
Trilling and Peyre,  is  profoundly skewed and misleading,  conveniently ignoring the
many examples of high Romantic artifice and rhetorical self-awareness evident in the
archly metatextual works of a Byron or Pushkin. As Arlette Michel rightly observes,
Romanticism,
[which is]  nostalgic regarding the resources of  eloquence,  often develops in the
direction of abundance, of copia (this being an oft formulated reproach against
Romanticism),  of  a  limited  rhetoric  where  hyperbole,  antithesis  and  the  image
dominate. But we more often than not forget the Romantic ressources of brevitas, 
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ellipsis and litotes,  the unsaid and ironic distancing which accentuates both the
tragic and the grotesque. (Michel, 1066)2 
10 It is hardly necessary to underline the almost comic irony of this literary historical
conundrum.  To  summarise:  poetic  sincerity  is  for  Lionel  Trilling  a  fundamentally
Romantic notion, largely neglected by the literature of the beginning of the twentieth
century which,  for him, was concerned with attempts to attain a greater degree of
“objectivity”  and “impersonality” (with Trilling’s  primary examples  being Eliot  and
Joyce). The two dates, 1908 and 1913, which for Henri Peyre designate the apogee of
sincerity  as  a  literary  criterion,  correspond  for  Lionel  Trilling  with  the  historical
moment when the expressive sincerity idolised by European Romanticism underwent
its  most  rapid and serious decline.  For  Trilling,  the heroes of  literary sincerity  are
Wordsworth, Hugo, and Goethe; for Peyre, they are Gide, Bourget, Lasserre, and Rivière.
11 To make sense of this disconnect we must perhaps accept that poetic sincerity can
never be associated with so-called “inherent” qualities of poetic texts, such as formal
simplicity  or  complexity,  unity  or  fragmentation  of  the  lyrical  subject,  absence  or
presence  of  irony  or  reflexivity; it  is  never  an  autonomous,  transcendent  criterion
existing outside the specific historical, enunciative, and rhetorical contexts in which it
takes form. This initial statement is profoundly necessary given the critical tendency to
link sincerity with a variety of abstract textual phenomena. According, however, to the
aesthetic values being espoused, any of these contrastive textual qualities can be seen
as  either  reinforcing  or  damaging  a  particular  poem’s  specific  relationship  to  a
hypothetical  sincerity.  We  may  thus  say  of  literary  sincerity  what  Louis  Menand
observes regarding the term “image,” namely that: 
[It] refers to a fiction every literary theory that uses the term tries to make real; but
since what it denotes cannot be settled on to anyone’s complete satisfaction, its
meaning is determined not so much by the particular set of practices it is intended
to describe as by the particular set of errors its  user has enlisted it  in reaction
against. (29)
12 It follows that what a poet or critic says about literary sincerity reveals to us less what
sincerity truly is, as autonomous term or concept, than it does the general conception
of literature that this particular individual is seeking to advocate or prescribe. In other
words, it is not with a prior definition of poetic sincerity that we may analyse poems; it
is with a prior vision of the poem that we may analyse poetic sincerity. 
13 This brief methodological statement indicates that sincerity can never be identified as
an inherent property of certain poetic works; nor can it be associated with particular
formal devices or modes of address. Sincerity rather appears as a profoundly mutable,
malleable  criterion  which,  like  a  true  rhetorical  figure,  can  change  entirely  in
accordance with the aesthetic, political, and ethical values with which it is enveloped.
Sincerity  may  just  as  cogently  be  associated  with  supposedly  Romantic  or  anti-
Romantic visions of the work of art, and with innovative or mainstream conceptions of
contemporary poetic verse—and we may of course wonder to what extent we are not
speaking, in both cases, of strikingly similar aesthetic and axiological divides. 
 
The Myth of Sincerity as a Conservative Criterion 
14 In spite of this, I do not think it an exaggeration to state that, for many readers of
contemporary  poetry,  and  certainly  for  young  poets  well-versed  in  notorious
The Rhetoric of the Rearguard? Sincerity in Innovative American Poetics
Transatlantica, 1 | 2016
4
innovative versus mainstream divides, sincerity may intuitively seem one of the most
reactionary poetic principles imaginable, associated with naïve visions of a transparent
relationship between author and text, or with the unilateral affirmation of an authentic
self. Have contemporary proponents of an expressivist sincerity thus managed to make
a large majority  of  readers  and critics  forget  that,  for  Anglo-American modernism,
poetic sincerity was precisely an anti-expressive principle, in stark opposition to what
was perceived as the identarian blindness of the Wordsworthian imperative that the
poet must be “a man speaking to men”? 
15 There is thus an apparent effort, on the part of a good number of innovative poets and
theorists,  to actively dissociate themselves from sincerity as  a  poetic  value,  for the
reason that sincerity frequently seems too profoundly contaminated with notions of
affective expressivity, lyrical ideation and subjective cohesion, to be integrated into the
fragmented or meta-reflexive forms of modern innovative verse. This often results in
an apparent absence of contemporary efforts to reform, or even to save sincerity, from
its reputation as a quietist or mainstream poetic value. 
16 An  initial  important  idea  thus  lies  in  the  literary  historical  observation  that  this
association between poetic sincerity, lyrical expressivity and subjective coherency is in
fact fairly recent. Such a conception bypasses the effort of modernist poets such as Ezra
Pound  and  T.S.  Eliot,  and  of  such  New  Critics  as  F.R.  Leavis  and  I.A.  Richards,  to
formulate poetic sincerity as an anti-expressive principle, grounded in the exigencies
of  poetic  technique.  Some  contemporary  readers  are  perhaps  familiar  with  Ezra
Pound’s famous “I believe in technique as the test of a man’s sincerity” (9),  or T.S.
Eliot’s  similar  claim  that  “honesty  never  exists  without  great  technical
accomplishment” (119). By valuing technique, Pound, Eliot and Leavis implicitly sought
to  reject  a  particular  Romantic  vision  of  sincerity  which,  emerging  out  of  the
Wordsworthian model of the Preface, was supposedly based on the denial of technique.
While  contemporary  poets  and  critics  often  recognise  the  extent  to  which  such
formulations were an explicit attack against the expressive, “everyman” conception of
sincerity  espoused  by  Wordsworth,  they  less  often  interrogate  why  this  modernist
vision  of sincerity  as  a  technical,  rhetorical  construct,  found  so  few  subsequent
advocates. 
17 This  apparently  intuitive  contemporary  association  of  sincerity,  however,  with
mainstream,  expressivist  or  confessionalist  traditions,  is  certainly  not  confined  to
readers.  Louise  Glück’s  early  nineties  essay  entitled  “Against  Sincerity”  provides  a
prime example of the failure, on behalf of a prominent poet, to integrate sincerity as an
innovative poetic criterion. In this text, Glück quite cryptically feels it necessary—and
this  feeling  is  in  itself  revealing—to  argue  that  poetry  need not  be  based  on lived
experience, nor conform to lived experience, in order to be of value: 
We are unnerved by the thought that authenticity, in the poem, is not produced by
sincerity. We incline, in our anxiety for formulas, to be literal: we scan Frost’s face
compulsively for hidden kindness, having found the poems to be, by all reports, so
much better than the man. This assumes our poems are our fingerprints, which
they  are  not.  And  the  processes  by  which  experience  is  changed—heightened,
distilled, made memorable—have nothing to do with sincerity. The truth, on the
page, need not have been lived. It is, instead, all that can be envisioned. (29)
18 What is curious in Glück’s formulation is firstly her restriction of poetic sincerity to the
reductive confines of the adequation between life and art.3 Is Glück setting up a straw-
man, an easily attackable version of poetic sincerity which few poets, even the most
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lyrically expressivist among them, would be willing to accept? As Peter Campion rightly
observes: “Glück argues that poetic truth stands apart from mere fact, and she takes
‘sincerity’ to stand for the ingenuous desire for a one-to-one relation between what
happened  and  what’s  written.  The  only  problem with  this  is:  who  can  imagine  an
intelligent person disagreeing?” (n.p.) Campion goes on to provide crucial context for
Glück’s apparently unnecessary claim. 
To be fair, we should see Glück’s essay in context. In several places in her book of
criticism, Proofs  and  Theories,  she  seems  compelled  to  make  an  anti-literalist
argument, one that carried more force fifteen years ago, during the glut of identity
politics and the poetry that drew support from it. It comes to resemble the claims of
a movement that has no relation to her own practice. 
19 Today, it may seem surprising that Glück felt it necessary to counter the simplistic and
reductive  vision  of  sincerity  proposed  by  the  dominant cultural  climate.  I  am  not
suggesting, however, that her gesture was entirely unwarranted: rather, the very fact
that Glück felt it necessary to write “Against Sincerity” is testament to the extent to
which  poetry,  at  least  within  the  wider  culture,  was,  and  to  many  extents  still  is,
perceived  according  to  criteria  of  subjective  adequation,  expressive  intensity,  and
identarian transparency. What is problematic in Glück’s essay is not her rejection of
sincerity as a simplistic congruence between life and art—about which we may all agree
—but rather her failure to postulate other hermeneutic possibilities within the concept.
In rejecting poetic sincerity without proposing variant models, innovative poetics risks
participating in—and thus reinforcing—the problematic association of sincerity with
reductive notions of expressivity, lyrical identity, and a totalizing truth. 
20 Sincerity’s failure to be fully integrated into the rhetorical and theoretical arsenal of
innovative poetic praxis may be further supported by another example, this time from
poet and critic Annie Finch. Indeed, the divide between the sincerity valued by what
Charles  Bernstein  has  called  Mainstream  Verse,  and  the  anti-sincerity  of  so-called
innovative poetics, is often so strongly felt that Finch identifies sincerity as the central
tenet  of  what  she  terms  anecdotal,  quietist  poetics:  “In  contemporary  free-verse
anecdotal poetry, that mode which Ron Silliman, following Edgar Allan Poe, has called
the ‘school of quietude,’ the apparent sincerity of the individual self, or soul, becomes
the central transcendent poetic criterion” (Finch, 25). Importantly, Finch is not merely
taking aim here at the so-called school of quietude for its reductive concept of poetic
sincerity. She is also addressing an explicit critique towards the evacuation of sincerity
as a poetic question within the context of late twentieth-century avant-gardes: 
Both kinds of poetry gain authenticity in the reader’s eyes to the extent that they
appear to leave behind,  or  transcend,  the “poem” as artifice,  a  crafted piece of
language  with  its  conventions  of  diction and rhythm and distinct,  recognizable
structural characteristics. Whether the spiritual self or its transcendent object is
the center of a contemporary poem, in either case the sensual “body” of the poem,
and the language that builds it, is beside the point, for both mainstream and avant-
garde critics. Whether purged with Puritanical zeal of anything that disturbs the
mundane  linguistic  flow  with  the  reek  of  the  “poetic”  on  the  one  hand,  or
“fractured,”  “fragmented,”  “ruptured”  with  tireless violence  on  the  other,  the
poem’s body has come to be despised by literary culture. (Finch 26)
21 Though we certainly may disagree with Finch here, her critique merits attention. In
Finch’s  formulation,  both “avant-garde” and “arrière-garde” poetries  attempt to do
away with sincerity as a linguistic, and profoundly rhetorical construct, only they do so
for different reasons. For expressivist modes, ranging from post-war confessionalism to
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“quietist” or “mainstream” forms, sincerity is supposedly outside of language, because it
locates  an  idealised  point  of  juncture  between  self  and  world,  attained  during  the
expressive  energumen  of  the  lyrical  sublime.  For  innovative  or  “avant”  traditions,
sincerity is similarly “outside” of language for the reason that it remains a chimerical
goal, a symbolic fantasy based on the utopian illusion of an authentic self, and of its
transparent modes of ideal speech. 
22 In other words, fragmentation, whether of the self or of discourse, does not “solve” the
problem of poetic sincerity. It merely delays or evacuates it. This failure of sincerity to
be integrated into innovative praxis is all the more surprising when one considers the
pivotal role played by the term in previous innovative traditions, such as its varied and
rich declensions within the poetics of  Louis Zukofsky.  For a poet such as Zukofsky,
sincerity is not a question, as it is for Lionel Trilling, of “congruence between avowal
and actual feeling,” nor, as for Henri Peyre, of congruence between lived event and
poetic  form.  Leaving  behind  these  problematic  paradigms  of  adequation,  Zukofsky
rather identifies sincerity as a phenomenological event: 
In sincerity shapes appear concomitants of word combinations, precursors of (if
there  is  continuance)  completed  sound  or  structure,  melody  or  form.  Writing
occurs which is the detail, not mirage, of seeing, of thinking with the things as they
exist, and of directing them along a line of melody. Shapes suggest themselves, and
the mind senses and receives awareness. (12) 
23 For  Zukofsky,  poetic  sincerity  is  a  moment  of  encounter.  It  manifests  itself  as  an
openness  to  the  world  which  takes  account  of  objects’  inherent  dynamism  and
ontological renewal. It is an attempt not to “think things,” but to “think things as they
exist”—that  is,  in  the  unfolding of  their  ontological  propensities,  which imperfectly
meet those of the perceptive subject. Shapes and words, objects and signs, graphisms
and sonic interplays, ideally relate, in sincerity, as ontological equals. What is described
is thus a primarily perceptive experience, in which a poetic relationship with the world
is founded on the apprehension of the world as object, and on writing as a process
which itself strives to attain the status of objecthood. 
 
The Absence of Zukofskian Successors
24 Though  the  conceptual  values  of  Zukofskian  sincerity—ranging  from  affective  and
perceptive intensities to the ethical imperative of what Robert Creeley calls “man
standing by his word”4 —continue to be deployed in the work of such poets as Charles
Olson, Robert Duncan, George Oppen and Denise Levertov, the term itself comes to be
colored by increasing ambivalence, with Creeley also claiming: “This issue of sincerity
in itself can be a kind of refuge of fools” (Creeley, n.p.). Further tracing its decline, we
may contrast the conception of poetic sincerity within post-war poetics, still positively
influenced by a Zukofskian phenomenology, with what the term is generally taken to
mean in contemporary poetics today. To do this, I will concentrate briefly on an essay
by Seth Abramson in which he returns to the movement of the New Sincerity of the
1990s. Abramson begins as follows:
It’s not so often anymore that we read a book of poetry and think to ourselves,
“This poet means exactly what they say.” It’s  a startling realization,  that we so
often praise the artistry of a poem or collection for having accurately captured the
artistic  ambitions  of  the  poet,  but  less  commonly  consider  how  and  when
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contemporary poetry is nonfictional, a direct address from the bared poet within
the poet. (n.p.) 
25 The  New  Sincerity represents  the  desire,  Abramson  observes,  “now  common  among
contemporary  poets,  to  achieve  escape  velocity  from  the  self-conscious  irony  that
marked literature at the tail end of last century, as well as the dry literary theory that
has  marked  presumptive  avant-garde  poetries  since  the  1970s.”  In  Abramson’s
formulation, the effort to escape irony entails an effort to escape theory. This is in
reality  unsurprising,  given  that  sincerity  has  a  long  history  as  an  ostensibly  anti-
theoretical concept. In truth, this apparent anti-theoretical quality of sincerity is an
aspect  of  its  enduring myth.  It  is  precisely  because  sincerity  is  a  profoundly,  even
intrinsically  theoretical  notion,  that  it  deserves  our  full  theoretical  attention.
Abramson goes on: 
We  see  sincerity  opening  its  eyes  and  accepting  what  it  sees—including  the
presumptive insincerity  of  multiple  selves  and multiple  realities—as ineluctable,
true, and essential. Thus lines which may at first appear ironic or sincere must be
read as existing outside, or above, either irony or sincerity. In this way the poet-
speaker creates a new metareality, one in which all elements of constituent realities
are true but by themselves terminologically insufficient. 
26 In  contrast  to  Louise  Glück  some twenty  years  before,  Abramson does  not  see  the
existence of multiple selves, or the fragmentation of self-identity, as being beyond the
scope  of  sincerity  as  a  poetic  criterion.  Indeed,  the  concept  is  easily  sufficiently
malleable  that  we  may  imagine  a  poetic  sincerity  that  takes  full  account  of  the
multiplication  of  personas,  personalities  and  contrasting  ethos,  without  its  being
yoked, as was the case for Trilling, to the ideal of a unified self. The problem however
with Abramson’s formulations resides in the fact that no speech, however multiplied or
self-aware,  may  ever  exist  “outside”  or  “above”  the  identarian  and  rhetorical
interrogations which sincerity invariably evokes. In truth, poetic sincerity never ceases
to form and perform a wilfully utopian, ideational and impossible gesture: that of the
escape from  language,  all  the  while  demonstrating  that  such  an  escape  is
fundamentally  unattainable.  Sincerity  thus  dramatises  the  paradoxical  desire  to
transcend language using language’s  very own means;  moreover,  it  shows that  this
tension is itself a linguistic and symbolic construct—that poetic sincerity, in spite of its
transcendent claims, will now and always remain a rhetorical and enunciative artifice. 
27 “Artifice”  must not  be  understood,  however,  in  a  negative  sense  of  that  which  is
untrue,  but  in  the  sense  of  that  which,  though  it  remains  a  technical,  intentional
construct, may very well retain an inherently powerful truth-content. For Abramson,
the poet “over-leaps both the sincerity-irony spectrum and also the sort of theory-as-
poetry or immanent language that might respectively define or perform it.” We must
remain wary of this supposed overcoming of such a spectrum. The danger of poetic
sincerity  emerges  when  poets,  critics  and  readers  begin  to  believe  that  such  a
promised, idealised escape from language is indeed possible within the realm of the
pragmatic sign—or even worse, that such an escape has, in a given case, actually been
attained.
28 If these three visions of poetic sincerity thus seem to me in some ways misguided, why
present them as examples of the failure to integrate sincerity as a workable criterion of
contemporary  innovative  verse?  In  concentrating  on conceptions  of  sincerity  more
amenable  to  innovative  praxis—and  most  notably  those  explored  in  the  work  of
Reznikoff, Oppen, and Zukofsky—innovative poetic traditions have displayed a marked
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tendency to neglect the widely held conceptions of poetic sincerity to which poets such
as Glück, Finch and Abramson adhere. Though one may disagree with the formulations
of these critics,  this is not a reason to claim that their arguments have no place in
critical discourse. Indeed, the unwillingness on behalf of some innovative poets and
critics to engage with more conservative or expressivist conceptions of poetic sincerity
is itself a revealing literary-historical blindness. After all, if a vast number of readers
believe  sincerity  to  be  associated  with  subjective  affirmation  and  expressive
transparency, we cannot simply ignore such convictions as though they did not exist,
as though they were so misguided that they were not even open to debate. In refusing
to engage with these conceptions, innovative poetics risks circumscribing its critiques
of poetic value to a paradoxically conformist environment, where only “innovative”
conceptions  of  key  notions  have  droit  de  cité—and  may  thus  be  debated  and,  if
necessary, judged. 
 
Sincerity and the Spectre of Postmodern Irony
29 If poetic sincerity, for poets such as W.H. Auden or Charles Reznikoff, was explicitly
contrasted with a wilful or unintentional distorsion of the realities of history, sincerity,
in this contemporary “innovative or conservative” divide, is contrasted not with the lie
of  untrue visions  of  the  self  or  the  world,  but  with the  enunciative  and rhetorical
problem of postmodern irony. This, indeed, is a crucial shift. This spectrum, which for
Auden and the generation of the 1930s was a question of the divide between “sincerity”
and “insincerity,” becomes a new divide not between sincerity and manipulative lying,
but between the emotional engagement of sincere discourse, and the affective distancing
of ironic or disengaged speech. A prime example of this shift is provided by one of
Charles Bernstein’s poems entitled “Thank You For Saying Thank You” (Girly Man, 8-9),
a brief analysis of which may help to shed further light on what is here at stake: 
Thank You for Saying Thank You
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calamities. This poem 
has 90 lines,
269 words, and 
more syllables than 
I have time to 
count. Each line, 
word, & syllable
have been chosen 
to convey only the
intended meaning





readers would each 
read the poem
in an identical 
manner & derive 
the same message 
from it. This 
poem, like all
good poems, tells 
a story in a direct 
style that never 
leaves the reader
guessing. While 
at times expressing 
bitterness, anger,
resentment, xenophobia, 
& hints of racism, its 
ultimate mood is 
affirmative. It finds 
joy even in 
those spiteful moments 
of life that 
it shares with 
you. This poem 
represents the hope 
for a poetry
that doesn’t turn
its back on 
the audience, that 
doesn’t think it’s
better than the reader,
that is committed 
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to poetry as a 
popular form, like kite 
flying and fly 
fishing. This poem 
belongs to no 
school, has no 
dogma. It follows
no fashion. It 
says just what 
it says. It’s 
real.
30 The simplest and most immediately evident reading of Bernstein’s poem is as a series of
claims  which  ironically  and  comically  present  the  naïve,  mainstream  desire  for
sincerity as semantic and subjective transparency—as a type of writing which would
allow  the  reader  to  glimpse the  unified  self  or  illuminated  world  beyond  poetic,
palimpsestic  obscurity.  But  the  poem  itself,  in  its  meta-reflexivity,  is  importantly
frequently wrong about its own make-up. It is clearly not “purely emotional,” as the
mere  fact  of  affirming  that  one  is  “purely  emotional”  is  itself  a  propositional,
rhetorical, and thus partly extra-emotional act. In this way, the rhetorical content of
the  verse  is  countered  and  undone  by  the  formal  context  within  which  these
propositions are imbricated.
31 Though Bernstein initially seems merely to be making fun of mainstream conceptions
of accessibility, transparency, or emotional truth, a deeper level is also at play. After
all,  if  this  poem  were  merely  snickering  in  the  corner  at  so-called  “Quietist”  or
“Mainstream” models  of  poetic  sincerity,  it  would hardly be so interesting.  As Ron
Silliman notes: “Much of what makes this poem work is that not every sentence here is
a lie.” (n.p.)  Indeed, many of the apparently ironic propositions of “Thank You For
Saying Thank You” tap in to a deeper desire—even among those of us most sceptical of
such problematic ideas as subjective transparency—to take such notions literally, to
believe in language’s fundamental possibility of being a transparent vessel of subjective
embodiment. As Silliman says: “To expect transparency of a language object, however
well intentioned, is inevitably to court disappointment if not outright disaster.” But
even if we know that such transpacency, such transcendent embodiment, is illusory,
impossible,  politically  problematic  and  pragmatically  unwise,  we  also  want  to
participate in this ideational dream, like the anti-Brechtian spectator lost in a play he
or she knows to be false. Though we recognise the intellectual limitation and practical
impossibility of such an aim, we may also sometimes hope, on some level, that poetry
contains “nothing hidden.” We may also dream of “poetry as a popular form / that
doesn’t turn / its back on / the audience, that / doesn’t think it’s / better than the
reader.”
32 In this way, Bernstein’s apparent pure irony turns back the mirror on the supposedly
self-aware,  theoretically conscious reader,  and instead of  a clear reflection of  naïve
mainstream principles, we find ourselves staring through the glass darkly, confronted
with our own hidden desires which we may harbour in spite, or even because, of our
supposed theoretical  sophistication.  I  would  argue  that  this  conscious naïvety,  this
awareness of  participating in the illusion of  poetic  sincerity,  is  at  poetic  sincerity’s
heart. Berstein’s text, or others such as Lyn Hejinian’s My Life, prove to us that even if
the  term  “sincerity”  is  conspicously  absent  from  the  theoretical  formulations  of
innovative poetics, the question of sincerity is not. 
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33 For this  reason,  poetic  sincerity  never ceases  to  shed light  on the various types of
readers  who  reside  within  us.  One  reader,  who  represents  the  learned  critics  and
theorists of  poetics we desire to be,  knows that poems are not “real,” that a poem
which “purely  expresses  the  feelings  of  the  author”  is  an  absurdity,  that  no  poem
“follows  no  fashion,”  and  that  in  all  poems,  as  in  all  language,  there  is  always
something hidden. There is also, however, another reader who dwells within us, one
who in spite of this awareness, like a child reading a fable, simultaneously believes and
does not,  and thus seeks to knowingly participate in an imagined horizon of poetic
sense where nothing is obscure, where the sign is one with its world, where the self
appears  garbed  in  the  raiments  of  a  full  ontological  transparency—in  brief,  where
poems are real, or at least we pretend, even for a fleeting moment, that they are. 
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NOTES
1. Even when not explicitly indicated here, categorical terms such as innovative or avant-garde,
conservative or mainstream, should be taken as inherently problematic, and rife with obvious
terminological limitations. 
2. “Dès les  premières années du [XIX e]  siècle s’instaure la recherche d’un langage qui  aurait
valeur  ontologique.  Cette  recherche,  souvent  nostalgique  des  ressources  de  l’éloquence,  se
développe volontiers dans le sens de l’abondance, de la copia (c’est un reproche souvent formulé
à  l’égard  du  romantisme),  d’une  rhétorique  restreinte  où  dominent  l’hyperbole,  l’antithèse,
l’image. On oublie plus souvent les ressources romantiques de la brevitas,  de l’ellipse et de la
litote, du non-dit, de la mise à distance ironique qui accentue et le grotesque, et le tragique”
(Michel, 1066).
3. We may note that this is much the same definition used by Henri Peyre when he speaks of
poetic sincerity as the demand that the poet “conform his life to his ideas.”
4. “This  issue  of  sincerity  in  itself  can be  a  kind of  refuge  of  fools.  I  am sure  that  Senator
Goldwater was sincere in certain ways, but that shouldn’t protect him from a hostile judgment.
The zealot  is  often sincere.  But  I  mean sincerity  in the sense that  goes back to Pound,  that
ideogram he notes: man standing by his word. That kind of sincerity has always been important
to me—to what I’m doing.” (Creeley, n.p.)
ABSTRACTS
How  did  the  criterion  of  poetic  sincerity  transform,  in  the  space  of  a  half-century,  from  a
fundamental tenet of radical modernism to an incarnation of lyrical and expressive orthodoxy?
Why have efforts to reintegrate sincerity into experimental poetics and literary traditions—such
as the problematic New Sincerity of the 1990s—met with limited success? Continuing a reflection
begun in my study Rhétorique de la sincérité,  I suggest that this disconnect between innovative
American  poetics  and  the  criterion  of  sincerity  may  be  traced  back  to  the  fundamentally
wrongheaded  association  between  sincerity  and  expression.  Reintegrating  sincerity  into
innovative  contemporary  verse  seems  possible  not  by  creating  a  new  form  of  “sincere”
expression, but by distancing sincerity from the notion of expressivity altogether. 
Comment  le  critère  de  la  sincérité  poétique  s’est-il  transformé  en  un  demi-siècle ?  Principe
fondamental du modernisme radical, comment en est-il venu à incarner l’orthodoxie lyrique et
expressive ? Pourquoi les efforts visant à réintégrer la sincérité dans les poétiques et traditions
de l’avant-garde – tel le mouvement problématique de la New Sincerity des années 1990 – ont-ils
rencontré un succès limité ? Poursuivant la réflexion entamée dans Rhétorique de la sincérité, je
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suggère ici que pour comprendre la rupture entre la poétique américaine innovante et le critère
de  la  sincérité,  il  est  bon  de  reconsidérer  l’association,  mal  fondée,  entre  la  sincérité  et
l’expression. Si réintégrer la sincérité dans la poétique contemporaine est possible, ce n’est pas
en créant une nouvelle  forme d’expression « sincère »,  mais  en distinguant la  sincérité de la
notion d’expressivité elle-même.
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